ISO 9001:2015

International Journal of Innovations & Research Analysis (IJIRA) [ Vol. 6 | No. 2(II) | April - June, 2026 ]

Rethinking Jurisprudence: Cognitive Structures and the Architecture of Legal Thought

Prabin Acharya

This paper explores the relationship between cognitive science and jurisprudence, emphasizing that legal thinking does not come about as a result of mere rational reasoning but that its development has been guided by deep-seated cognitive structures such as heuristics, schemas, conceptual metaphors, and narratives. With reference to empirical research conducted in judicial psychology, dual process theory, and cognitive linguistics, the paper shows that the way legal reasoning has been structured is heavily reliant on cognitive activities occurring beneath our level of conscious perception. Based on a comprehensive synthesis of experimental jurisprudence, behavioral law and economics, and neurolaw, the paper outlines a cognitive jurisprudence which, while being descriptive, also offers valuable prescriptive insights. The argument that legal systems cannot be designed effectively without consideration of their underlying cognitive architecture is presented as an attempt to create a more just, open, and epistemically modest system rather than any sort of capitulation to irrationality. This paper incorporates systematic data analysis, comparative frameworks tables, and explains the methodology behind the integration of cognitive science with law.

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